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Model Continuity of Congress Statute 
SETH BARRETT TILLMAN∗ 
An Act to Maintain the Continuity of Congress and the People’s Rep-
resentation in Government during a National Crisis1 
 
Whereas an emergency arising from war, terrorism, the outbreak of 
disease, or for any other reason, may give rise to the death or to the unex-
plained absence of congressional members or to their inability to attend, 
thereby precluding a single house of Congress from reaching or maintain-
ing a quorum, but leaving its sister house with a quorum;   
 
Whereas a single house of Congress may validly exercise limited dele-
gated legislative authority if its unicameral orders, resolutions, and votes 
are presented to the President and if its unicameral orders, resolutions, and 
votes are authorized by a prior statute expressly conferring delegated legis-
lative authority;  
 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled: 
  
 ∗  Mr. Tillman – Harvard Law School, JD (2000), University of Chicago, AB (1984) – is an asso-
ciate of Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A., Wilmington, DE, and is a member of the Delaware bar.  The 
views expressed do not necessarily represent the views of the firm or its clients.  The following foot-
notes are not part of the Model Statute, but are merely provided as helpful comments.   
 1. Authority for this statute can be found in the express text of the Constitution.  See U.S. Const. 
art. I, § 7, cl. 3 (Orders, Resolutions, and Votes Clause); id. at art. II, § 3 (The President “may, on 
extraordinary occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them . . . .”); see also Seth Barrett Tillman, 
A Textualist Defense of Article I, Section 7, Clause 3: Why Hollingsworth v. Virginia Was Rightly 
Decided, and Why INS v. Chadha Was Wrongly Reasoned, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1265 (2005); Gary Lawson, 
Comment, Burning Down the House (and Senate): A Presentment Requirement for Legislative Subpoe-
nas Under the Orders, Resolutions, and Votes Clause, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1373 (2005); Seth Barrett 
Tillman, Reply, The Domain of Constitutional Delegations Under the Orders, Resolutions, and Votes 
Clause, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1389 (2005); but see INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 956-57 (1983) (holding 
that Congress may not make binding legal relations absent bicameralism and presentment).   
  For the purposes of this Model Statute, Chadha is not controlling.   
  Although, the reasoning of Chadha arguably extends to actions taken pursuant to this Model 
Statute, the facts of any litigation arising from this Model Statute are substantially different from the 
facts of Chadha.  Unlike Chadha, all orders, resolutions, and votes made pursuant to this Model Statute 
are presented.  Any litigation arising under this Model Statute will permit lower courts to take a fresh 
look at Chadha’s bicameralism rationale apart from the presentment issues, which are not at play under 
the terms of this statute. 
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Section 1: If the President of the United States convenes2 both houses 
of Congress, [or if the two houses of Congress are required to convene 
under the authority of some constitutional provision, statute, or congres-
sional resolution,]3 and one house of Congress (the “absent house”) fails to 
make a quorum within ten calendar days from the first day both houses 
were required to concurrently meet, but the other house (the “continuing 
house”) reaches a quorum and organizes, this Act delegates to the continu-
ing house the constitutional limit4 of all delegable legislative power to the 
continuing house (1) until such time as the absent house sends a message5 
to the continuing house to the effect that the formerly absent house has a 
quorum, or (2) until ninety calendars days (the “ninety calendar day pe-
riod”) have elapsed following the latter of either (A) the end of the afore-
mentioned ten calendar days period or (B) following the last proclamation 
of the President to convene or reconvene Congress taking effect during 
some prior ninety calendar day period.  In every case, the continuing 
house’s authority to legislate under this Act in the form of a single house 
order, resolution, or vote terminates with the end of the House’s constitu-
tional two-year term.6   
  
 2. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.  Under the procedures provided for, a continuing house has the 
power to augment the President’s powers, but cannot contract presidential authority over his veto, 
absent veto override requiring the action of both houses.  Thus, the President has strong incentives to 
use his convening power.   
 3. Italicized language within brackets is optional.   
 4. I am not recommending that the maximal limit be delegated.  Instead, the purpose of the Model 
Statute is to instruct legislative draftsmen how that limit might be reached through constitutionally 
valid means should it be considered desirable.  It would be entirely appropriate to delegate some subset 
of all delegable authority, keeping in mind that future conditions make it difficult to predict what au-
thority a future lone-house might wish to or need to exercise in the service of the public good. 
 5. My view, based in part upon longstanding congressional practice, is that this message is not an 
order, resolution, or vote that is subject to presentment under U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 7, 
Clause 3.   
 6. My first impression was that this provision might have a tendency, as a purely formal matter, to 
undermine filibuster empowering rules, and that these effects might be more pronounced at the end of a 
session, i.e., last-period effects.  On reconsideration, I no longer believe this to be the case, although I 
should be glad to be instructed by experts with game theory expertise.   
  Should the minority absent itself, no problem is caused; the majority still has a quorum.  Can the 
majority shift control to the other house by intentionally absenting itself?  Yes, but only if when doing 
so, they maintain majority control of a rump house without a quorum.  See infra n. 14 and accompany-
ing text (providing for twenty member Senate and forty member House).  In the Senate, for example, 
this would require the absent majority to have no more than ten members on the floor and the minori-
ties’ entire membership (on the floor) to be no more than nine members.  This would leave the majority 
with control of the presiding officer and the ability to send and shape messages to the sister house, but 
without a quorum (twenty members) under this statute.  Of course, to pull this gambit off, the majority 
(pre-emergency) must generally outnumber the minority roughly nine to one.  If the majority has such a 
healthy supermajority, the incentive to engage in gamesmanship is, I think, reduced to nil.   
  The real danger of the procedure provided for in this Model Statute is that in a chamber that 
actually lost the majority of its members, the rump house might leave the presiding officer in the con-
trol of the minority.  In these circumstances, the chair might refuse to concede (by message) the loss of 
its quorum and pretend a sufficient number of its members remain alive, with a concomitant ability to 
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Neither the receipt of notice of a quorum from the absent house nor the 
end of the House’s two year term nor the passing of the ninety calendar 
day period voids the continuing legal validity of any final orders, resolu-
tions, or votes already in the possession of the President, such latter orders, 
resolutions, and votes, although not yet signed and not in-force, remain 
capable of coming into force either by the President’s signature or in the 
absence of the President’s signature by the passage of ten days (Sundays 
excepted) from presentment should both houses of Congress be in session 
on the tenth day following presentment. 
Any order, resolution, or vote, although final, but not already presented 
to the President, is made void upon the continuing house’s receipt of notice 
of a quorum from the absent house, the end of the House’s two year term, 
or the passing of the ninety calendar day period. 
Provided that: Congress may, by statute or by any order, resolution, or 
vote passed pursuant to this Act, vest jurisdiction, original or appellate, 
exclusive or concurrent, in any civil or in any other non-criminal matter, 
case, or controversy arising under this Act in the federal district courts, in 
the federal circuit courts, in the Supreme Court of the United States, in the 
United States bankruptcy courts, in any court presided over by a 
United States magistrate judge, in state or territorial or District of Colum-
bia courts, in federal or state or territorial or District of Columbia adminis-
trative law judges or commissions, including the courts and administrative 
law judges and commissions of Puerto Rico and any United States posses-
sion or commonwealth, in any court organized by a sovereign or recog-
nized Indian or Native American tribe, or in any United States military 
court or commission to the extent consistent with the Constitution of the 
United States;7   
Provided that: Congress may, by statute or by any order, resolution, or 
vote passed pursuant to this Act, vest jurisdiction, original or appellate, 
exclusive or concurrent, in any criminal matter, case, or controversy aris-
ing under this Act in the federal district courts, in the federal circuit courts, 
  
organize in the near future.  The presiding officer might do this as a negotiating tactic with the still 
intact house.  The quid pro quo would be: I will concede the loss of my quorum if you do or enact X.  
This problem has a simple solution.  The President should just reconvene Congress and thereby force 
both houses to organize or reorganize.  If a house fails to do so, and if it fails to indicate by message 
that it has actually made a quorum and has actually organized, then the sister house can begin to legis-
late, and the absent house will lose its obstructionist bargaining chip.  Compelling a house to reorganize 
in the event of a presidential proclamation to convene may require separate organic authority.  But see 
Thomas Jefferson, A Manual of Parliamentary Practice: for the Use of the Senate of the United States 
§ 51 – A Session (2d ed. 1812) (“If [Congress is] convened by the President’s proclamation, this must 
begin a new session, and of course determine the preceding one to have been a session.”) (italics in 
original).   
 7. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and 
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made . . . .”).   
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in the Supreme Court of the United States, in state or territorial or District 
of Columbia courts, including the courts of Puerto Rico and any United 
States possession or commonwealth, in any court organized by a sovereign 
or recognized Indian or Native American tribe, and in any United States 
military court or commission to the extent consistent with the Constitution 
of the United States;  
Provided that: No order, resolution, or vote of the continuing house 
may take effect prior to the time the President signs it, should he or she 
choose to sign it;  
Provided that: No order, resolution, or vote of the continuing house 
may take effect prior to repassage by both houses pursuant to United States 
Constitution Article I, Section 7, Clause 3 should it be vetoed by the Presi-
dent;8  
Provided that: No order, resolution, or vote of the continuing house 
may take effect prior to ten days (Sundays excepted) following present-
ment should the President choose not to sign it and should it have the force 
of law absent the President’s signature;  
Provided that: Every order, resolution, or vote passed pursuant to this 
Act will cease to have prospective legal effect no later9 than sixty days 
following the date the absent house reaches a quorum and gives notice of 
such both to the continuing house and to the President of the United States, 
notwithstanding that the absent house giving notice to that effect may be a 
successor House or Senate.  However, any vested rights, duties, or obliga-
tions that accrue prior to the aforementioned sixty-day automatic sunset 
may still be enforced by any party, and nothing in this provision terminates 
any court’s jurisdiction or the jurisdiction of any administrative law judge 
or commission to hear or to continue to hear cases or controversies in such 
matters; 
Every order, resolution, or vote passed pursuant to this Act will cease 
to have prospective legal effect no later than one hundred and twenty days 
following the date the order, resolution, or vote takes effect.  However, any 
vested rights, duties, or obligations that accrue prior to the aforementioned 
  
 8. If Congress’s intent is clear, federal constitutional law permits retroactive civil liability if en-
acted by a proper statute, embodying presentment and bicameralism.  (Repassage of an order, resolu-
tion, or vote by two-thirds of both houses of Congress after presentment and a presidential veto is 
functionally analogous to a statute for this purpose.  The substance would be the same, if not the form, 
although admittedly reasonable minds might disagree on this fine point.)  Absent bicameralism, it is not 
altogether clear if an order, resolution, or vote could impose retroactive civil liability.  Retroactive 
criminal liability is, in all events, impermissible, without regard to the legislative instrument chosen by 
Congress.  See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.   
 9. The continuing house is, of course, free to make orders, resolutions, or votes that have sunset 
provisions taking effect prior to this time.  Likewise, the continuing house may create rights or obliga-
tion that, although they vest prior to sunset, cease to be judicially enforceable with the organization of 
the absent house.   
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one hundred and twenty-day automatic sunset may still be enforced by any 
party, and nothing in this provision terminates any court’s jurisdiction or 
the jurisdiction of any administrative law judge or commission to hear or to 
continue to hear cases or controversies in such matters; 
Provided that: If any provision of this Act is held to be unconstitu-
tional, the remainder of this Act shall not be affected by the holding, but 
the continuing house may waive this requirement in any order, resolution, 
or vote passed pursuant to this Act; 
Provided that: Should this Act or any provision thereof be determined 
to be unconstitutional, or should any order, resolution, or vote passed pur-
suant to this Act be held invalid for any reason, or should any Executive 
Branch official or private or public agent of the Executive Branch have 
acted beyond the scope of his or her authority under either this Act or un-
der any order, resolution, or vote passed pursuant to this Act, no court, 
administrative law judge, or commission may impose any individual civil 
liability against any such Executive Branch official or private or public 
agent in his or her private capacity for any action taken pursuant to an or-
der, resolution, or vote passed pursuant to this Act, notwithstanding the 
Executive Branch official or private or public agent having exceeded the 
scope of his or her legal authority, unless that Executive Branch official or 
private or public agent acted in subjective bad faith, and specifically in-
tended the type of harm caused, and acted with knowledge of the illegality 
of his or her own acts at the time done, but the continuing house may 
waive this requirement in any order, resolution, or vote passed pursuant to 
this Act; 
Provided that: In any conflict between this Act and any other act of 
Congress or treaty, without regard to the latter’s date of enactment or rati-
fication, this Act governs, but the continuing house may waive this re-
quirement in any order, resolution, or vote passed pursuant to this Act; 
Provided that: Any criminal defendant convicted for violation of any 
order, resolution, or vote passed pursuant to this Act shall not have access 
to federal habeas review of his conviction or sentence in any case where 
any Article III court, other than the Supreme Court of the United States, 
had jurisdiction to grant the relief sought or any substantively similar relief 
as an original matter or on direct appeal, notwithstanding the intentional, 
unintentional, or inadvertent waiver of such relief caused by either defen-
dant’s failure or defendant’s counsel’s failure to timely invoke the Arti-
cle III court’s jurisdiction, but the continuing house may waive this re-
quirement in any order, resolution, or vote passed pursuant to this Act;10  
  
 10. This provision does not preclude (even as a default) federal habeas review of a defendant’s 
conviction or sentence arising from proceedings before state courts, territorial courts, District of Co-
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Provided that: For the purposes of determining a quorum sufficient to 
pass an order, resolution, or vote pursuant to this Act, the whole member-
ship of a house may be calculated to include already qualified members 
[and members-elect],11 then living, not yet either expelled, disqualified, or 
removed, and not having resigned,12 and, a majority of the whole number 
of members includes a majority of those aforementioned members [(but 
not members-elect)]13 if they are in the physical presence of the presiding 
officer on the floor of the house or otherwise capable of participating in 
legislative business or senate executive business by artificial means al-
though not physically present on the floor of the house, or determined to be 
present in any other way consistent with the orders, resolutions, or rules of 
that house, or any joint or concurrent resolutions or rules, or any federal 
statute, not otherwise inconsistent with the Constitution of the 
United States; but in no event shall a quorum of the House be determined 
to be present in the absence of forty qualified members, and in no event 
shall a quorum of the Senate be determined to be present in the absence of 
twenty qualified members.14  Nothing herein requires any presiding officer 
  
lumbia courts, sovereign or recognized Indian or Native American tribal courts, or before United States 
military courts or commissions.  Generally, the only exception to this outcome would be where the 
prisoner waived the right to remove (non-federal) criminal proceedings into a lower federal court.  See 
e.g. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442 (2006) (permitting removal by federal civil officers), 1442a (2006) (permitting 
removal by members of the United States armed forces).  Where the defendant was convicted or sen-
tenced by an Article III court, other than the Supreme Court of the United States, this provision pre-
cludes, as a default, federal habeas review.   
 11. See supra n. 3.  There are good reasons to exclude members-elect from the calculation of the 
size of the membership and the quorum.  First, the inclusion of members-elect makes reaching a quo-
rum more, rather than less, difficult.  Moreover, it is not clear, as a matter of settled judicial determina-
tion, that the presiding officer may constitutionally seize members-elect as he or she can seize absent 
qualified members.  See U.S. Const. art. I, § 5 cl. 1.  My view is that the matter should be settled by 
practice under each house’s rule-making authority. 
 12. The provision is not inconsistent with U.S. Constitution Article I, Section 5, Clause 1.  The 
practice approved of here was substantially similar to the one enforced by Congress’s presiding officers 
during the Civil War to the universal acclaim of the loyal war-wearied nation.  No attack on the consti-
tutional validity of any statute passed by such a “weak” quorum was ever successfully prosecuted.  Cf. 
Floyd M. Riddick & Alan S. Frumin, Riddick’s Senate Procedure: Precedents and Practices, Sen. Doc. 
No. 101-28, at 1039 (101st Cong. 2d Sess. 1992) (“A quorum shall consist of a majority of the Senators 
duly chosen and sworn.”); Constitution, Jefferson’s Manual, and Rules of the House of Representatives 
of the United States One Hundred and Eighth Congress, H.R. Doc. No. 107-284, at 801-02 (Charles W. 
Johnson ed., 2d Sess. 2003) (“Upon the death, resignation, expulsion, disqualification, or removal of a 
Member, the whole number of the House shall be adjusted accordingly.”).   
 13. See supra nn. 3 & 11. 
 14. When the First Congress initially met, a House quorum was (no more than) a mere thirty of fifty 
nine (constitutionally authorized) members; a Senate quorum was (no more than) a mere twelve of 
twenty two (constitutionally authorized) members.  See U.S. Const. art. I, §§ 2-3, 5.  But see The Fed-
eralist No. 59, 308 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001) (noting 
incorrectly that “a quorum of the [Senate] is to consist of sixteen members”).  The First Congress met 
prior to ratification by North Carolina (constitutionally authorized five House members and two Sena-
tors subject to ratification) and Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations (constitutionally authorized 
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to question or ascertain the presence of a quorum absent a motion to that 
effect by a member.  Nothing herein upsets any presumptions created by 
the Constitution of the United States, custom, precedent, order, rule, reso-
lution of either or both houses, or statute, or based upon any determination 
founded upon the presiding officer’s inherent or customary authority per-
mitting a presiding officer to assume the presence of a quorum.   
 
Section 2: On the motion of any member desiring a quorum call, no 
presiding officer may determine that any member is dead, or that the mem-
ber’s absence is unexplained, or that any member is unable to attend 
should the presiding officer receive a timely written signed notarized (or in 
lieu of notarization, sealed, certified, acknowledged, or otherwise under the 
penalty of perjury) notice from the member (i) stating that the member has 
voluntarily chosen to absent himself from the meeting; and (ii) stating 
where the member is to be found during the course of the remaining con-
gressional session.  The inability of the presiding officer or his agent to 
find the absent member at the location stated therein rebuts any presump-
tion that the document is authentic.  Notice is timely should the presiding 
officer be in actual or constructive possession of it prior to any quorum 
call.  Notwithstanding any statute or order, resolution, or rule of that house, 
or joint or concurrent rule or resolution15 to the contrary, any member who 
has transmitted the notice described in this section may not be paid or re-
ceive any salary or any other financial or non-financial perquisite of con-
gressional office, including salaries for staff, for the time period in which 
  
one House member and two Senators subject to ratification).  See The World Almanac and Book of 
Facts 1998, at 514 (Robert Famighetti ed., 1997).   
 15. The phrase “order, resolution, or vote” is a term of art.  It refers to single-house or bicameral 
congressional instruments having the force of law because they were authorized or ratified by a prior or 
subsequent statute.  Orders, resolutions, or votes having the force of law are passed pursuant to U.S. 
Constitution Article I, Section 7, Clause 3, and like statutes, they are presented to the President.   
  On the other hand, if the terms “order” or “resolution” are used in any other context, they gener-
ally refer to single-house or bicameral congressional instruments passed under each house’s rule-
making authority.  See U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.   
  There is some ambiguity with regard to the meaning of “joint resolution.”  The term is some-
times used to mean no more than a statute, although customarily joint resolutions (functioning as stat-
utes) are of limited purpose and effect, and are titled differently from statutes.  See Lawrence E. Filson, 
The Legislative Drafter’s Desk Reference 352 (Congressional Quarterly Inc. 1992) (“The title of a joint 
resolution customarily begins with a verb in its gerundive form rather than its infinitive form -- ‘Pro-
viding for’ or ‘Authorizing’, for example, instead of ‘To provide for’ or ‘To authorize’ as in the case of 
a bill . . . .”).  In the Model, “joint resolution” is not used in this bill-substitute sense, although unfortu-
nately this seems to have become the prevailing usage.  See e.g. Edwin Meese III et al., The Heritage 
Guide to the Constitution 92 (2005) (describing current usage).  Rather, I use “joint resolution” syn-
onymously with “concurrent resolution,” a resolution of both houses, but not intended to be a statute, 
and, for that reason, not presented to the President.  For example, a resolution of the two houses pro-
posing a constitutional amendment is usually called a “joint resolution.”  And no one with a drop of 
common sense would confuse such an instrument with a statute. 
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the member remains absent.  Notwithstanding any statute or order, resolu-
tion, or rule of that house, or joint or concurrent rule or resolution to the 
contrary, any member who has transmitted the notice described in this sec-
tion may not be paid or receive during the time period in which the mem-
ber remains absent any money, salary, pension, or other financial benefit 
out of the treasury of the United States or any arm or agency of the United 
States government, the government of the District of Columbia, the gov-
ernment of Puerto Rico, or the government of any territory, or United 
States possession, or commonwealth, or arm or agency thereof.  In the ab-
sence of receipt of the described notice, a presiding officer has discretion 
to make a good faith determination based upon the totality of the circum-
stances to the effect that an absent member is presumed dead and to adjust 
the whole number of members and the quorum of the house accordingly.16  
 
Section 3: This Act shall take effect on the date of its enactment.  
 
Section 4: A matter, case, or controversy arises under this Act if it 
arises under this Act or if it arises under any order, resolution, or vote 
passed pursuant to this Act.   
 
Section 5: For the purpose of passing an order, resolution, or vote pur-
suant to this Act in the House, in the absence of the Speaker, the Speaker 
pro tem, and all other elected House officers provided for by statute or 
order, resolution or rule of the House or joint or concurrent rule or resolu-
tion to preside in the absence of the Speaker or Speaker pro tem, the senior 
most member present, measured by continuous years of service in the 
House, shall preside, but if two or more persons shall have equal terms of 
service, the oldest such member shall preside, but in every such case where 
the presiding officer is the senior most member and presides by operation 
of this statute, a vote of the majority of members present, a quorum being 
present, may choose the presiding officer.   
 
Section 6: For the purpose of passing an order, resolution, or vote pur-
suant to this Act in the Senate, in the absence of the Vice President, the 
Senate President pro tem, and all other elected Senate officers provided for 
by statute or order, resolution or rule of the Senate or joint or concurrent 
rule or resolution to preside in the absence of the Vice President or Senate 
  
 16. A presiding officer having determined that a member is dead may seek permission from the 
house to contact the governor of the State of the dead member for the purpose of having the governor 
make a temporary appointment to the Senate and/or to set in motion that State’s election processes.  A 
presiding officer may not need permission to that effect from the house’s members if such contacts are 
already provided for under the rules of that house or by custom.   
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President pro tem, the senior most member present, measured by continu-
ous years of service in the Senate, shall preside, but if two or more persons 
shall have equal terms of service, the oldest such member shall preside, but 
in every such case where the presiding officer is the senior most member 
and presides by operation of this statute, a vote of the majority of members 
present, a quorum being present, may choose the presiding officer.   
 
Section 7: All orders, resolution, or votes passed pursuant to this Act 
may be authenticated by the presiding officer of each house or by the chief 
legislative officer of each house, the Secretary and the Clerk, or should 
either be absent, by an assistant Secretary or Clerk, or their designees.  All 
orders, resolution, or votes passed pursuant to this Act shall be authenti-
cated by the presiding officer of each house passing or concurring in the 
measure.  No order, resolution, or vote passed pursuant to this Act shall be 
held to be void should either or both chief legislative officers fail to au-
thenticate it.  Any order, resolution, or vote passed pursuant to this Act 
which is authenticated both by the presiding officer or officers of the house 
or houses passing or concurring in the measure and by the chief legislative 
officer or officers of the house or houses passing or concurring in the 
measure, or their assistants or designees, raises a presumption, conclusive 
upon the courts of the United States and upon administrative law judges 
and upon commissions, to the greatest extent permitted by the Constitution 
of the United States, to the effect that all constitutionally mandated proce-
dural requirements have been complied with, but the continuing house may 
waive this presumption in any order, resolution, or vote passed pursuant to 
this Act.   
 
Section 8: Passing or concurring in an order, resolution, or vote pursu-
ant to this Act waives the right of that house or that house’s successor, to 
the greatest extent permitted by the Constitution of the United States, to 
contest the constitutionality or the validity of the measure either on non-
delegation grounds or for being ultra vires in litigation before any court, 
administrative law judge, or commission, but the continuing house may 
waive this requirement in any order, resolution, or vote passed pursuant to 
this Act.   
Authentication of an order, resolution, or vote passed pursuant to this 
Act by the presiding officer of a house which did not pass or concur in the 
measure waives the right of that house or that house’s successor, to the 
greatest extent permitted by the Constitution of the United States, to con-
test the constitutionality or the validity of the measure either on non-
delegation grounds or for being ultra vires in litigation before any court, 
administrative law judge, or commission, but the continuing house may 
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waive this requirement in any order, resolution, or vote passed pursuant to 
this Act.   
Should the President of the United States sign an order, resolution, or 
vote passed pursuant to this Act, his signature waives his right, and the 
right of the Executive Branch, and the right of any successor in office, in-
cluding any Acting President, to the greatest extent permitted by the Con-
stitution of the United States, to contest the constitutionality or the validity 
of the measure either on non-delegation grounds or for being ultra vires in 
litigation before any court, administrative law judge, or commission, but 
the continuing house may waive this requirement in any order, resolution, 
or vote passed pursuant to this Act.   
 
Section 9: Neither this Act nor any provision of this Act may be 
amended, altered, changed, modified, repealed, suspended, or nullified by 
any order, resolution, or vote passed pursuant to this Act.17  In any conflict 
between this Act and any order, resolution, or vote passed pursuant to this 
Act, this Act governs.  No order, resolution, or vote passed pursuant to this 
Act may delegate any legislative authority, power, or privileges to either or 
both houses, including any committee or subcommittee, or to any mem-
ber, or to any elected or appointed legislative officer, or to any officer that 
could be removed from office either by any legislative instrument not re-
quiring presentment to the President or by the direct or indirect authority of 
any elected or appointed legislative officer. 
  
 17. But cf. The Queen on the Application of Jackson v. H.M. Attorney General, [2005] EWHC 94 
(QBD (admin) 2005) (upholding application of the Parliament Act of 1949), aff’d, [2005] EWCA CIV 
126 (Eng. Ct. App.), aff’d, [2005] UKHL 56 (U.K House of Lords).  It appears that the Law Lords have 
permitted subsidiary single-house legislation to substantively alter the terms of the prior statutory 
delegation.  Were this (untoward) result permitted under the Model, the statutory limitations on single-
house action within the Model could be set aside by a subsequent order, resolution, or vote.  My own 
view is that Section 9 is unnecessary.  The courts should reach exactly the same result by operation of 
the Supremacy Clause.  See U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2.  Rather, Section 9 is included in an abundance of 
caution. 
